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The past year has been marked in Israel not only by the COVID-19 pandemic,
but also by an unprecedented political crisis. On March 2nd, 2020 a third round of
elections within the course of a year took place in Israel. Israel’s 35th government
was sworn in on May 17th, 2020 as a “Unity Government”, with Netanyahu as prime
minister and Benny Gantz, Netanyahu’s former contender, in the newly-established
role of “alternative prime minister”. Under the unity agreement between Netanyahu’s
Likud party and Gantz’s Kahol-Lavan party, Netanyahu would serve as prime
minister for a period of 18 months, after which he would be replaced by Gantz for
the same period. The agreement endorsed a principle of power-sharing between
the two, and stipulated that a voting mechanism would be established to ensure
the equal voting power of each of the two partners. The establishment of the Unity
Government was justified by the two former contenders as necessary in light of the
challenges posed by the COVID-19 pandemic.
However, it became clear early on that the Unity Government is ridden with dispute,
is unstable, and is not functioning in accordance with the unity agreement. The
voting mechanism was never established. Netanyahu and Gantz failed to achieve
agreements on major topics, and continuously exchanged accusations, each
blaming the other for the government’s disfunction. Finally, on December 23, 2020,
the Knesset dispersed after it failed to pass a state budget, as required by law. Israel
is thus off to elections, again, scheduled to take place on March 23, 2021, a year
after its last elections. This while Netanyahu’s trial, which opened on May 24, 2020,
is looming over the political crisis.
Israel’s response to the pandemic thus took place in an unstable and highly
polarized political climate. This affected the decisions taken in several ways. First,
throughout the crisis, it was difficult to achieve agreement within the government
on required actions. In addition, decisions often reflected political rather than
professional considerations, a problem that was exacerbated by the instability of the
coalition. The prospect of additional elections also effected the political will to enforce
restrictions, in particular in the Ultra-Orthodox sector, as Ultra-Orthodox parties are
perceived by Netanyahu as necessary partners in any government coalition.
The Legal Framework – From Emergency
Regulations to Legislation
The legal framework in Israel in responding to the pandemic has considerably
changed throughout the course of the year. The initial measures implemented in
response to the pandemic were based on two main pieces of legislation.
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First, article 39 of the “Basic Law: The Government” authorizes the government to
issues emergency regulations in a general state of emergency. In Israel, a state of
emergency has been declared by the Knesset (the Israeli legislature) on security
grounds and continuously extended since the establishment of the state in 1948.
At the beginning of the pandemic, the government built on the existing state of
emergency to issue a large number of emergency regulations, implementing, among
other measures, movement and gathering restrictions, surveillance and contract
tracing measures, regulation of the labor market and court system, and more.
The second law employed at the beginning of the pandemic is the Public Health
Ordinance of 1940 (the “Ordinance”), a legacy of the British Mandate that is still in
force, which authorizes the Ministry of Health to take measures needed in order
to protect public health, including to issue orders necessary in order to contain an
infectious disease. The Ordinance also contains special authorities that can be
employed when a severe risk to public health is declared. COVID-19 has indeed
been declared to pose such a risk, and special authorities have accordingly been
invoked. Orders issued under the Ordinance include, for example, isolation and
quarantine requirements, the requirement to wear masks, and certain gathering
restrictions.
The vast use of emergency regulations raised public criticism, and petitions were
filed to the Supreme Court both against specific emergency regulations, such as
those authorizing the General Security Service to employ electronic surveillance
measures for contact tracing, as well as generally against the use of emergency
regulations. The claims were that, while the use of emergency regulations could be
justified for a short period of time or in the absence of a functioning Knesset, and
while the pandemic may justify certain restrictions on individual rights, rights should
generally be restricted only through primary legislation.
As a result of these critiques, the Knesset set to replace the use of emergency
regulations with laws. The two most important laws enacted by the Knesset in
this regard are the Law of Special Authorities to Deal with the Novel Coronavirus
(Temporary Provision) 2020 (the Corona Law), enacted by the Knesset on July 23,
2020, and Law Authorizing the GSS to Take Part in the National Efforts to Minimize
the Spread of the Novel Coronavirus and Promoting the Use of Civilian Technology
to Trace Those Who Were in Close Contact With the Ill) (Temporary Order) 2020,
enacted by the Knesset on July 1, 2020.
The Corona Law authorized the government to declare a COVID-19 emergency
situation for a period of 45 days, to be extended for periods of up to 60 days. A
COVID-19 emergency situation was declared with the enactment of the Corona Law
and extended to this day. The Corona Law has a sunset clause according to which
it will expire on June 30, 2021, unless extended. The enactment of the Corona Law
replaced Basic Law: The Government as the main act (in addition to the Ordinance)
authorizing the government to issue regulations imposing restrictions in order to
contain the pandemic. While Basic Law: the Government allowed the government
to issue emergency regulations without specifying the purposes or measures,  , the
Corona Law contains a closed list of authorities.
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Nonetheless, the Corona Law has been criticized for allowing extensive restrictions,
and for the fact that while it contains a mechanism for parliamentary supervision of
the regulations issued, supervision is ex-post rather than ex-ante. Specific concern
has been raised regarding Amendment No. 2 of the Corona Law, which authorized
the government to declare a “special coronavirus emergency situation”, a situation
which grants it the power to limit demonstrations. The declaration of such situation,
and the temporary limitation of demonstrations that followed it were argued to be a
political abuse of the pandemic and raised concerns that other abuses may follow.
Legislative and Judicial Oversight – To What Extent
Did They Make a Difference?
Parliamentary supervision of the executive measures taken changed throughout the
year. Emergency regulations issued under Article 39 of Basic Law: The Government
do not require approval of a parliamentary committee. Since this was the main tool
employed at the beginning of the pandemic, and coupled with the fact that Israel
was, at the time, in a period of transition and without functioning parliamentary
committees, oversight of the measures taken was weak during the first months of the
pandemic.
After the establishment of the Unity Government and the setup of parliamentary
committees, including the setup of a special COVID-19 parliamentary committee,
parliamentary oversight became more meaningful. Following the enactment of the
Corona Law it also became more structured, as the Corona Law does include a
mechanism of parliamentary oversight of the regulations enacted pursuant to it. That
being said, parliamentary oversight is still far from satisfactory. First, the Corona
Law sets up a mechanism that require a parliamentary committee to approve the
regulations   after they were enacted, rather than before. In addition, the Corona
Law allows flexibility in directing regulations to specific parliamentary committees
for approval, allowing the government to circumvent parliamentary committees it
perceives as less lenient.
The relative weakness of parliamentary overview turns the spotlight to the Supreme
Court. The Israeli Supreme Court is generally perceived to be activist, accessible,
and not to shy away from controversial matters. In light of this, one might have
expected it to perform a significant role in overseeing and supervising measures
imposed by the government, especially when applied under emergency powers and
involving significant restrictions of individual rights.
In practice, however, the Supreme Court has been exceptionally restrained in
overseeing measures implemented by both the government and the Knesset.
Dozens of petitions have been filed to the court during the course of the year,
challenging measures such as general and local lockdowns,  movement restrictions,
restrictions on prayers, closing of borders, the closing of educational institutions
and economic redress measures. Some of the petitions challenged the necessity of
measures. Other focused on distinctions between groups made by various measures
or the criteria underlying them. The vast majority of the petitions have been rejected
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by the court. Notably, many petitions have been rejected on the grounds of failure
to exhaust measures. In other cases, the court has accepted the state’s position
regarding the necessity of the measures implemented at face value. Basic Law:
Human Dignity and Liberty, which lays down the constitutional framework for
reviewing restrictions of rights, requires such restrictions to be for a “proper purpose”
and proportional. In petitions related to the pandemic, the court has generally simply
accepted the state’s claim that the measures taken fulfill these requirements, without
requiring the government to substantiate its claims via evidence.
There are a few notable exceptions. On March 1, 2021, the Court has limited the
use of use of military surveillance technology, restricting its use to individuals who
don’t cooperate with investigations. On March 17, 2021, the Court decided that
regulations imposing limitations on the entry of Israeli citizens to Israel and on
those wishing to leave the country down could not be extended after they expire,
as they are unconstitutional, in particular in light of their possible effect on the right
to vote in the Israeli elections, held on March 23, 2021. On April 4, 2021, the Court
determined that a regulation that had expired months earlier, limiting demonstrations
further than 1km from one’s home was unconstitutional. All of these decisions,
however, were delivered relatively late in the course of events. In addition, the
remedy received was either late or partial: the Court did not prohibit the use of
tracking, but only limited it. It did not invalidate the law authorizing the government
to restrict demonstrations, but only the already-expired regulation. And while it did
determine that a cap of 3000 on the number of Israelis that could enter the country
was unconstitutional, it declared the regulations could not be extended rather that
that they were immediately void.
2021 Outlook – What Now?
The specific human rights concerns changed throughout the pandemic. In the first
months, gathering restrictions, including limitations on the demonstrations and
prayers, economic redress measures and contact tracing tools stood at the center
of concerns. However, as the crisis unfolded, other issued took the stage. Current
human rights concerns involve, for example, the closing of Israel’s borders, including
to Israeli citizens wishing to enter the country, the decision to use electronic cuffs to
monitor home isolations, and the measures that may be taken in order to encourage
people to vaccinate.
Two additional human rights related concerns arose throughout the pandemic. The
first is the lack of order, clarity and transparency in the enactment and publishment
of COVID-19 regulations and limitations. While time indeed is of an essence in
a situation of emergency, the potential for abuse of the situation for unjustified
restrictions of rights renders due process especially important. However, all
throughout the crisis, the process of enactment of regulations that severely restrict
individual rights was hasty and non-transparent. Voting on serious restrictions was
conducted through text messages among cabinet members, without presentation
of factual grounds justifying limitations of rights and without proper debate or
discussion. Regulations were often published few hours before they entered into
force, with non-accurate descriptions of them published earlier in the media, creating
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uncertainty among the public regarding the law in force. Finally, discussions of the
COVID-19 cabinet established by the government have been declared confidential
for 30 years, sparking speculation and public distrust.
The second issue regards enforcement policy of COVID-19 regulations. Throughout
the pandemic, media outlets reported differences in enforcement measures among
populations and sectors, an issue which raised public fury. Notable criticism has
been raised with respect to enforcement in the Ultra-Orthodox sector, following
reports of a large number of violations of restrictions on gathering, and, in particular,
violations of the regulations ordering school closures. Media outlets have also
pointed the relatively small number of fines dispensed within the Ultra-Orthodox
sector for violations of the regulations, despite the appeared prevalence of such
violations. It has been argued that with the Ultra-Orthodox parties necessary for
Netanyahu to form a coalition in the upcoming elections, the decision to refrain from
enforcement in the Ultra-Orthodox sector is political.
An event such as the COVID-19 pandemic is inherently ridden with uncertainty.
However, in Israel, the decision-making process was also tainted as politicized,
which casted a shadow of illegitimacy on the restrictions enacted. In addition to the
ongoing concerns regarding extreme restrictions of specific rights, the pandemic
in Israel also raises more general concerns regarding the state of the rule of law in
what is already a fragile democracy.
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